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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAN L. POWELL, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. Case No. 16520 
ATLAS CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Respondent 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves conflicting unpatented lode mining claims 
in Emery County, Utah, in which each party seeks to quiet its 
title. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LONER COURT 
The District Court, Judge Maurice Harding presiding, found 
the issues in favor of Defendant-Respondent in its Memorandum 
Decision, made detailed findings, and issued a decree quieting 
the title of Defendant-Respondent in its mining claims against 
Plaintiffs-Appellants. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Respondent seeks an affirmance of the judgment of 
the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE MATERIAL FACTS 
As in Appellants' Brief, the mining claims of Respondent are 
collectively referred to as ATLAS CLAIMS and the mining claims of 
Appellants are collectively referred to as POWELL CLAIMS. Respond-
ent also uses the same designation of the various groups of ATLAS 
CLAIMS as do Appellants, namely GRAMLICH CLAIMS, WAREHAM CLAIMS, 
HIHOPE CLAIMS and TAHAWAS CLAIMS. (See page 3 of Appellants' 
Brief). 
Respondent agrees with the facts (as distinguished from the 
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argument) contained in the Statement of Facts on pages 2-5 of 
Appellants' Brief, except in the following particulars: 
1. Respondent disagrees with the argument and conclusions 
set forth on pages 2 and 5 to the effect that the land was subject 
to relocation at time Appellants located their claims. 
2. Respondent disagrees with the argument and conclusion on 
page 2 that the HIHOPE CLAIMS of Respondent are invalid. 
3. There are actually 56 WAREHAM CLAIMS rather than 54 as 
stated on page 2. The two WAREHAM CLAIMS located in February of 
1961 and shown on Exhibit 76 were omitted. 
4. Exhibit 78, rather than Exhibit 68 as stated on page 3, 
shows the location of TAHAWAS CLAIMS. 
5. The conveyances to Petro-Nuclear, Ltd., in 1967, referr~ 
to on page 3, did not include TAHAWAS CLAIMS which were located 
by Petro-Nuclear, Ltd., in March, 1968. (Exhibits 72 and 78). 
6. The lease to Continental Oil Company referred to on page 
4 was granted by Petro-Nuclear, Ltd. (then the owner of the 
property) on September 26, 1972, and was confirmed by Silver Bell 
Industries, Inc. (then the owner) on February 12, 1973. (Exhibits 
57 and 72). 
Respondent contends that the Statement of Facts in Appellants' 
Brief does not contain all the material facts. The following 
facts, generally set forth in chronological order, also appear 
from the record: 
GRAMLICH CLAIMS are divided into four sub-groups, according 
to the date of location, with the names of the claims in each 
sub-group as follows: 
Original Gramlich Group (Located in August, 1945 as set 
forth in Exhibit 56) 
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Wedding Bell, San Rafael, Desert Moon, Desert Moon 1, 
Desert Moon 2, Desert Moon 3, Soup Thiessen, Don, Chester, Katy, 
August, Philip Fredrick, Peggy, Johnny Boy, Atomic Bomb, Betty A, 
Desert Rat, Hirohito's Downfall, Honey Moon, Little Mike, Marjory 
Ann, and Reefer. 
1950 Gramlich Group (Located in April and May, 1950, as set 
forth in Exhibit 56) 
Desert Moon 4, Desert Moon 5, Desert Moon 6, Johnny Boy 1, 
and Vanura. 
1951 Gramlich Group (Located in March, 1951 as set forth in 
bhibits 31 and 32) 
Katy 1, Katy 2, August 1, August 2, Johnny Boy 2, Johnny Boy 
3, Johnny Boy 4, Vanura 1, Vanura 2, and Vanura 3. 
1953 Gramlich Group (Located in May, 1953 as set forth in 
Exhibit 55) 
Vanura 4, Vanura 5, Vanura 6, Vanura 7 and Vanura 8. 
Because repeated reference is made to various maps in the 
record, an explanation of some of those maps is helpful. 
The Trial Court found that Exhibits 41, 42 and 43 "accurate-
ly portray the location on the ground and dimensions" of ATLAS 
CLAI!1S. (Memorandum Decision dated February 22, 1978; Finding of 
Fact No. 16 in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated May 
18, 1979). These exhibits, on a scale of 1 inch equals 200 feet, 
were prepared by Charles Howard Skipper, Sr., from a survey made 
by his firm, Skipper Resources, Incorporated, between October, 
1977 and the trial of this case. (Transcript of March 21, 1978, 
8ages 6 3-7 4) . Charles Howard Skipper, Sr. , and Skipper Resources, 
!ncorpora ted, are hereinafter sometimes referred to as SKIPPER. 
'TLAs CLAIMS, as shown on Exhibit 41 (covering claims in Southwest 
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area), Exhibit 42 (covering claims in North area), and Exhibit 43 
(covering claims in Southeast area) are shown on Exhibit 47, a 
composite map prepared by SKIPPER on a scale of 1 inch equals 600 
feet. (Transcript of March 21, 1978, pages 66-67). Exhibit 32 
is a map, prepared by SKIPPER, of some of GRAMLICH CLAH1S as 
shown on Exhibit 47. (Transcript of March 21, 1978, page 75). 
Exhibits 48, 49 and 50 are transparencies showing POWELL CLAIMS 
on the same scale as Exhibit 47, which overlay Exhibit 47 and 
better demonstrate the conflict between ATLAS CLAIMS and POWELL 
CLAIMS than will Exhibits 1 and 3. (Transcript of Harch 21, 
1978, pages 76-78). Exhibit 71 is a map which shows some of the 
mine workings (which are identified by number) and drilling on 
ATLAS CLAIMS with reference to the claim boundaries (which are 
shown essentially as they are on Exhibits 41, 42, 43 and 47) and 
to which reference was made by several of the witnesses as herein-
after set forth. 
In March, 1951, J. W. Gramlich, the locator of GRAMLICH 
CLAIMS and Otho Hurphy, while surveying Original Gramlich Group 
and 1950 Gramlich Group, found some of the original monuments, 
rebuilt those which had been destroyed or could not be found, and 
posted and recorded amended notices of location. (Exhibit 56; 
Transcript of March 21, 1978, pages 4, 5, 9, 10, 13, 22; Exhibit 
31). A~ the same time, they located 1951 Gramlich Group. 
(Transcript of March 21, 1978, pages 5-6, 16, 18, 24, 25; Exhibit 
31) · In describing this work, Mr. !lurphy recognized Exhibit 32 
as a map of GRAMLICH CLAIMS. (Transcript of March 21, 1978, 
pages 7, 15). The amended notices on Original Gramlich Group and 
1950 Gramlich Group and the original notices on 1951 Gramlich 
Group, prepared by Mr. Gramlich and Mr. Murphy, in addition to 
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describing the claims with reference to a section corner, show 
the relationship of each claim in the group to another claim or 
claims. (Exhibit 31). 
Samuel R. McDougall, in 1949, in 1952, and from November, 
1953 until July 1957, worked and mined GRAMLICH CLAIMS, which 
work and mining he described in detail with reference to parti-
cular claims and which he recognized as being located as shown on 
Exhibits 4 7 and 71. (Transcript of April 26, 1978, pages 8-26). 
Phil Gramlich and his brother, John Gramlich, drilled and 
mined, in 1952, on particular GRAMLICH CLAIMS as shown on Exhibit 
71. (Transcript of April 26, 1978, pages 34-44). 
In 1953, Melvin Carlson, a mining engineer, made a thorough 
inspection, using a map, of Original Gramlich Group, 1950 Gramlich 
Group and 1951 Gramlich Group. (Transcript of March 21, 1978, 
pages 120-123). He "verified that a goodly portion of the monu-
ments were there" and that "most of the monuments were stone, 
with a large, long stone in the center surrounded by other 
stones." (Transcript of March 21, 1978, page 123). 
In May, 1953, J. w. Gramlich, with the assistance of Mr. 
C~lson, located 1953 Gramlich Group so that the West line of 
IJanura 4, 5, 6 and 7, on the ground, was common with the East 
line of the earlier Vanura, Vanura 1, Vanura 2 and Vanura 3. 
(Transcript of March 21, 1978, pages 124, 125, 127-129; Exhibit 
47; Exhibit 55). In 1954, Mr. Carlson moved the corners on the 
:ast line of Vanura 6 and 7 (which includes the Southeast corner 
of Vanura 5) East up to 50 feet so they were exactly 1, 200 feet 
2ast of Original Gramlich Group (Betty A, et al.) from which Hr. 
:arlson began his survey in locating 1953 Gramlich Group, and 
~os~:ed and recorded amended notices correcting the bearing in the 
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description of those claims. (Transcript of Barch 21, 1978, 
pages 126-129; Exhibit 55). Mr. Carlson observed that the monu-
ments on all GRAMLICH CLAIMS were in place up to the time he 
stopped working on the property in April, 1955. 
March 21, 1978, pages 126, 127). 
(Transcript of 
Frank Hovis, who worked on GRAMLICH CLAIMS from April or 
May, 1954 to January, 1964, for Four Corners Uranium Corporation, 
whose name was later changed to Four Corners Oil & Minerals 
Company (hereinafter referred to as FOUR CORNERS), described 
extensive drilling and mining operations on particular claims and 
the existence of the monuments, making reference to Exhibits 47 
and 71 and Exhibits 94, 95 and 96; the latter three exhibits 
being sectionalized maps of GRAMLICH CLAIMS showing, on a larger 
scale, mine workings and drill hole locations as on Exhibit 71. 
(Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 53, 54, 67-77; Transcript of 
April 26, 1978, pages 45-74). In 1954 and in 1956 or 1957, the 
monuments were all in place and were readily identifiable because 
they were "Gramlich monuments," which were "either a triangular 
rock or a rectangular rock up in the center of another pile of 
rocks." (Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 70-72; Transcript 
of April 26, 1978, pages 50,51). 
Roger Head, a surveyor employed by FOUR CORNERS on GRAMLICH 
CLAIMS from the fall of 1960 through 1962, observed the monuments 
and reestablished any that were knocked down at that time, was 
acquainted with the various mines by the designated numbers, and 
recognized at the trial the claims as shown on Exhibit 47. 
(Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 52-60. See Exhibits 71, 94-
96). In February, 1961, Mr. Head located HIHOPE CLAIMS which 
were surveyed and described with reference to GRAMLICH CLAH1S · 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 7 
(Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 55-58, 62-64; Exhibit 69). 
James A. Vaughn, an employee of Respondent, then the lessee 
from Petro-Nuclear, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as PETRO-
NUCLEAR), then the owner, described drilling and mining on parti-
cular claims and mines on ATLAS CLAIMS as shown on Exhibit 71, 
between September 1, 1967 and September 1, 1968. (Transcript of 
March 22 pages 90-95; Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 16, 19, 
20; Exhibits 70 and 72). The lease of Respondent was terminated 
on October 2, 1968. (Exhibit 90). 
In 1968 and 1969, Orville w. Brammier surveyed GRAMLICH 
C~IMS and WAREHAM CLAIMS for PETRO-NUCLEAR, which work he de-
scribed with reference to Exhibit 47. (Transcript of March 23, 
1978, pages 2-5, 10, 11, 13, 14). He found the existing menu-
ments, constructed new green steel monuments, and located, for 
PETRO-NUCLEAR, TAHAWAS CLAIMS to fill small gaps between certain 
GRAMLICH CLAIHS and which TAHAWAS CLAIMS were described with 
reference to GRAMLICH CLAIMS. (Transcript of March 23, 1978, 
p~es 3-15; Exhibit 78). 
In July, 1972, Dwight Crossland, a mining engineer, inspected 
ATLAS CLAIMS, found the green corners erected by Mr. Brammier and 
used them, with a map, to locate the various mines. (Transcript 
of March 22, 1978, pages 100-102). 
In February and March, 1973, Continental Oil Company (herein-
after referred to as CONOCO) , the lessee under PETRO-NUCLEAR, 
drilled 22 holes on ATLAS CLAIMS, having an average depth of 900 
feet, a total depth of 19,260 feet and a total cost of $32,609.42. 
(Exhibit 57; Transcript of March 21, 1978, pages 142-144; ~ran­
script of Harch 22, 1978, pages 2-5, 8-16, 44, 46-51; Exhibits 
i9-64). In October and November, 1973, CONOCO drilled 59 holes 
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on ATLAS CLAIMS, having an average depth of about 450 feet, a 
total depth of 25,923 feet, and a total cost of $34,223.00. 
(Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 16-29, 25-27, 31-42; Ex-
hibits 65-67). The location of this drilling is shown on Exhibit 
58, which includes an outline of ATLAS CLAIMS, with the holes 
drilled in February and March marked in green and the holes 
drilled in October and November marked in red. (Transcript of 
March 22, 1978, pages 2, 6-9, 16, 22, 27-32, 39, 40). Ray Kozus~. 
CONOCO's project geologist, testified that the drilling by CONOCO 
contributed to a geologic evaluation of the "entire claim block" 
(ATLAS CLAIMS). (Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 28-32, 37, 
38. See pages 43, 44 of this Brief). 
From January through May, 1974, Appellants located 45 claims 
named as follows: Marion 7-10, Gamma 9-12, Alpha 1, Alpha R, 
Alpha U, Mac 5-10, Apex 1, Ace 1-10, Yellow Sands 0, Yellow Sands 
1-12, and Ridge 1-4, which conflict with the following ATLAS 
CLAIMS (33 in number), to-wit: Wedding Bell, San Rafael, Tahawas 
3, Betty A, Little Mike, Soup Theissen, Don, Desert Moon 2 and 4, 
Chester, Katy, Katy 1 and 2, Philip Fredrick, August, August 
1 and 2, Peggy, Johnny Boy, Johnny Boy 1-4, Ajax 22, and Hihope 
1-9. (Exhibits 1, 3, 5-16, 47, 48 and 50). 
CONOCO released its lease in January, 1975, but in December, 
1974, Respondent, while investigating ATLAS CLAIMS, did 3,295 
feet of drilling on Vanura 4, Vanura 5 and Vanura 8 claims at a 
cost of $5,766.25. (Exhibit 91; Transcript of March 22, 1978, 
pages 83-85; 102-103; Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 38-47, 
51; Exhibits 74 and 80). 
All the drilling done by CONOCO and Respondent penetrated 
the ore bearing formation and the results were properly evaluated. 
_______,.. 
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(Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 5, 6, 11, 12, 16-20, 26, 27, 
30-38, 40-42; Transcript of ~larch 23, 1978, pages 40-45, 47-51; 
Exhibit 6 8) . 
In January, June and July, 1975, Appellants located 13 
claims named as follows: Yellow Sands A, B, C, D, E, and F, Hac 
1-4, Bridge 3 and 4, Bridge Fraction, which conflict with the 
following ATLAS CLAIHS (17 in number), to-wit: Little Hike, Don, 
Johnny Boy 2 and 3, Hihope 1 and 6-8, Soup Thiessen, Desert Hoon 
1-6, and Ajax 22 and 23. (Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 16-19, 47-50). 
On March 3, 1975, Respondent acquired ownership of ATLAS 
CLAIHS, and between that date and September 1, 1975, mined at a 
cost of $14.00 per ton, 1,905 tons of material, making a total 
reasonable cost of $26,670.00, from the area of Hine No. 9 (Vanura 
2, 3, 6 and 7), Mine No. 11 (Katy 1 and Johnny Boy 1), and Mine 
No. 2 (Vanura 4 and 8), in addition to ore mined and shipped from 
the >'ledding Bell claim. (Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 83-
85, 104, 105; Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 23-30, 35, 36, 
57, 58, 62, 65; Exhibits 71, 72 and 74). 
Affidavits were recorded with reference to the above described 
IVork by CONOCO and Respondent for the assessment years ending 
September 1 in 1973, 1974 and 1975. (Exhibit 77). Albert E. 
Dearth, the President of Atlas Minerals, a division of Respondent, 
and a qualified geologist familiar with the area, testified that 
the drilling and mining done by CONOCO and Respondent benefitted 
and contributed to the development and extraction of uranium ores 
from the entire group of ATLAS CLAH1S, that there "is ore and 
~lneralization all over the area," that there are trends, traces, 
'atterns and streaks that lead from one ore body to another and 
chat even the information provided by a barren hole is valuable· 
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(Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 67-73, 80, 85. See also 
Transcript of April 26, 1978, pages 76, 77; this Brief, pages 44-
46). 
The Trial Court found that for each of the critical periods 
the required assessment work was done and that the work benefitted 
each of ATLAS CLAIMS. (Findings of Fact Nos. 17, 18 and 19 in 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated May 18, 1979.) 
on September 1, 1975, Appellants located Yellow Sands 13 
which conflicts with the following ATLAS CLAIMS, to-wit: Hihope 
7 and 8. (Exhibits 20, 47 and 48). 
In the summer of 1977, William Francis Price, acting for Re-
spondent, surveyed some of the lines of ATLAS CLAIMS as indicated 
on Exhibit 41, found all of the monuments or evidence thereof 
along the entire line, with the exception of two or three points, 
and constructed new two by two monuments. (Transcript of March 
21, 1978, pages 131-140). 
Exhibits 41, 42 and 43 show where monuments were found by 
SKIPPER, some of which were described as "a sharp rock protruding 
out of the center" or as a "stone turned on in (end) sitting ... in 
rocks around them" (See earlier reference in this Brief on pages 
5 and 6 to "Gramlich monuments"). (Transcript of March 21, 1978, 
pages 63, 65, 67, 72, 74-75, 113, 114). SKIPPER found evidence 
of earlier surveys and some of the green steel posts. (Transcript 
of March 21,1978, pages 67, 85, 86, 114). 
ARGUMENT 
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT I--THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
CONCLUDING THAT GRAMLICH CLAIMS ARE NOT INVALID BECAUSE OF ALLEGED 
DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN THEIR LOCATION ON THE GROUND AND THE DE-
SCRIPTIONS IN THE AJ1ENDED AND ORIGINAL NOTICES OF LOCATION MADE 
IN 1951 AND IN FINDING THAT ATLAS CLAIHS ARE LOCATED AND THEIR 
DIMENSIONS ON THE GROUND ARE AS SHOWN ON EXHIBITS 41, 42 AND 43. 
a 
v 
o· 
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Appellants' Argument I can be separated into two contentions: 
First, that the land covered by some of GRAMLICH CLAIMS does not 
conform to the descriptions contained in the amended and original 
notices made in 1951, thereby invalidating the claims; and second, 
that those same GRAMLICH CLAIMS have been "shifted", "walked" or 
moved from their place of original location so that the Respondent 
cannot claim the land presently covered. 
The statute which governs is 30 u.s.c.A., § 28, the pertinent 
part of which reads as follows: 
..•• All records of mining claims •.. shall contain ••• such a 
description of the claim or claims located by reference 
to some natural object or permanent monument as will 
identify the claim ••.• 
Respondent concedes that some of the amended notices on 
Original Gramlich Group and 1950 Gramlich Group and the original 
notices on 1951 Gramlich Group are not perfectly accurate in 
describing the location of the claim with reference to the section 
corner mentioned in the notices. The discrepancy lies in the 
general bearing of the group of claims. The claims are described 
as running North, when their actual bearing on the ground is about 
North 17° East; so that while there is little discrepancy on the 
South portion of the claims (where the major conflict area is) , 
as the distance increases from the original tie-in point the 
variance increases. (See Exhibits 41, 42, 43 and 87). 
The notices, which are contained in Exhibit 31, describe 
each claim with reference to other claims in the group so that if 
one claim is found either on the ground or in the records it 
~uld not be difficult to find the balance of the claims because 
of their stated relationship to each other. 
\vhile Appellants do not cite any, there are many cases on 
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the issu~ of the sufficiency of the description with reference to 
a natural object or permanent monument which show that considerable 
latitude is allowed and that strict, technical compliance is not 
required; that a reference to another mining claim is sufficient; 
that a description is sufficient if, under all the facts and 
circumstances, it fixes the general locality of the claim; that a 
variation between the boundaries of a claim as marked on the 
ground, and the description in the notice, will not, by itself, 
invalidate the claim; and that the sufficiency of the description 
is a question of fact. Russell v. Chumasero, 4 Mont. 309, 1 Pac. 
713 (1882); Upton v. Larkin, 7 Mont. 449, 17 Pac. 728 (1888); 
Garner v. Glenn, 8 Mont. 371, 20 Pac. 654 (1889); Hanson v. Fletcher, 
10 Utah 266, 37 Pac. 480 (1894); Riste v. Horton, 20 Mont. 139, 
49 Pac. 656 (1897); Wilson v. Triumph Consolidated Mining Co., 19 
Utah 66, 56 Pac. 301 (1899); Farmington Gold Mining Co. v. Rhymney 
Gold & Copper Co., 20 Utah 363, 58 Pac. 832 (1899); Wells v. 
Davis, 22 Utah 322, 62 Pac. 3 (1900); Bonanza Consolidated Mining 
Co. v. Golden Head Mining Co., 29 Utah 159, 80 Pac. 736 (1905); 
Londonderry ~1ining Company v. United Gold Mines Co., 38 Colo. 
480, 88 Pac. 455 (1907); Ninemire v. Nelson, 140 t-vash. 511, 249 
Pac. 990 (1926); Cranford v. Gibbs, 123 Utah 447, 260 P.2d 870 
(1953); Fuller v. Hountain Sculpture, 6 Utah 2d 385, 314 P. 2d 842 
(1957). See also 58 C.J.S., Mines and Minerals, 1948, §52, page 
106; 2 Lindley on Mines, Third Edition, 1914, § 382, beginning at 
page 904; Upton v. Santa Rita Mining Co., 14 N.M. 96, 89 Pac. 275 
(1907). 
Cranford v. Gibbs, supra, a Utah case, sustains the finding 
of the lower court that the claims were valid, even though actu-
ally located in an area distant from that referred to in the 
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notices of location. 
le Fuller v. Mountain Sculpture, supra, another utah case, is 
directly in point. The claim was described in the notice of 
location as running "due north-south" but was actually "25 degrees 
west of north •.• so that if the description were applied literally 
it would not include" the area "in controversy." This court 
found no basis to disturb the finding of the trial court that the 
claim was where the monuments were and held that the variance did 
not invalidate the claim. 
In the case at hand, the Trial Court found that valid and 
proper notices of location were posted and recorded which includes, 
by implication, a finding that the descriptions were sufficient. 
(See Finding of Fact No. 12 in the Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law dated May 18, 1979). 
"The rule of review of issues of fact is that all of the 
evidence and every inference and intendment fairly arising there-
from should be taken in the light most favorable to the findings 
made by the trial court." Rummell v. Bailey, 7 Utah 2d 137, 320 
P.2d 653 (1958), citing Jensen v. Logan City, 96 Utah 53, 83 P.2d 
311 (1938) and Toomer's Estate v. Union Pac. R. Co., 121 Utah 37, 
239 P. 2d 163 (1951). 
Applying the above rule, the evidence does sustain the 
finding of the Trial Court that the amended notices and original 
notices made on GRAMLICH CLAIMS in 1951 were sufficient. 
Appellants can hardly complain about technical defects in 
the descriptions in the notices for GRAHLICH CLAIMS when the 
descriptions in the notices on POIVELL CLAIMS are such that Appel-
lants' surveyor testified that the same could not be platted at 
all fror:1 the notices. (Transcript of March 23, 1978, page 139.) 
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The primary thrust of Appellants' Argument I is that some of 
GRAMLICH CLAIMS have been moved. Finding of Fact No. 16, that 
Exhibits 41, 42 and 43 accurately show the location of ATLAS 
CLAIMS, includes a rejection by the Trial Court of this conten-
tion, and is a finding that the claims have not been moved. 
The sole grounds asserted by Appellants to support their 
argument is that a platting of some of the amended and original 
notices of location made by J. W. Gramlich and Otho Murphy in 
1951 does not cover exactly the same ground as that shown in 
Exhibits 41, 42 and 43. 
In case of a variation as to the location of a claim between 
the monuments on the ground and the description in the notices, 
the monuments control. 58 C.J.S., Hines and Minerals, 1948, § 
52, page 106; American Mining Law, 1943, Volume I, Bulletin 123, 
§ 536, page 317; 2 Lindley on Mines, Third Edition, 1914, § 382, 
pages 904-905. This is the holding of this Court in Fuller v. 
Mountain Sculpture, supra. 
The facts in the Statement of Material Facts show that 
GRAMLICH CLAIMS actually existed on the ground from the time of 
location as they are now shown on Exhibits 41, 42 and 43. 
Evidence (which is only briefly referred to in the Statement of 
Material Facts but is more completely indicated in the entire 
record) of recognition of the claims and extensive drilling and 
mining operations from the earliest days at established mines 
(which could not be moved) on particular claims, all as shown on 
Exhibits 47 and 71; continuity in the maintenance of the monuments 
at their present location; the continued existence of some of the 
"Gramlich monuments"; and the location of the 1953 Gramlich Group 
(which was accurately described in the amended notices) adjoining 
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the earlier GRAMLICH CLAIMS on the grou.~d; all support the finding 
of the Lower Court. (See this Brief, pages 2-10). 
Appellants' contention was made by appellants in cranford v. 
~, supra. The Yellow Canary claims of respondents were 
described in the notices as being two miles Northeast of Marysvale, 
Utah "along Old County Highway." Appellants contended that the 
claims were originally located in an area designated by the Court 
for convenience as Area 1, miles from the subsequent surveyed 
location, known as Area 2. Area 1 was considerably closer to the 
Old County Highway (referred to in the notices of location) than 
Area 2. 
After summarizing the conflicting testimony, the Utah Supreme 
Court said: 
We have generalized the principal testimony only to 
point out that a finding as to the original location 
of the Yellow Canary claims is dependent upon the 
credibility of the witnesses. The trial court, 
having heard and observed the witnesses and after 
visiting the actual lands involved, resolved the 
issues in favor of the respondents and against the 
appellants. We are not inclined to disturb his 
findings. 
The same can be said here, and under the rule of review in 
Rummell v. Bailey, supra, there is clearly evidence to support 
the finding of the Trial Court that GRAMLICH CLAIMS have not been 
"shifted", "walked" or otherwise moved. 
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT II--THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN FINDING THAT DESERT RAT CLAIMS AND SAND VALLEY CLAIMS WERE NOT 
VALIDLY LOCATED AND THAT IF IT IS ASSUMED THAT SAID CLAIMS "IVERE 
VALIDLY LOCATED, THE ASSESSMENT WORK HAD NOT BEEN DONE AND THE 
LANDS WERE OPEN TO LOCATION "IVHEN HIHOPE CLAIMS OF RESPONDENT WERE 
LOCATED. 
Appellants assert that the land covered by HIHOPE CLAIMS 
!located in February, 1961) was validly appropriated by prior 
Desert Rat 2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as DESERT RAT CLAIMS) 
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and Sand Valley and Sand Valley 1-6 (hereinafter referred to as 
SAND VALLEY CLAIMS) and was not open to location in February, 
1961. 
In analyzing the evidence regarding DESERT RAT CLAIMS and 
SAND VALLEY CLAIMS it should be remembered that Appellants do not 
claim under those alleged locations, but rather assert them in an 
effort to defeat HIHOPE CLAIMS of Respondent which were located 
many years prior to POWELL CLAIMS. From Columbia Standard Corp. 
v. Ranchers Exploration and Development, Inc., lOth Cir., 468 
F.2d 547 (1972), citing Ranchers Exploration & Development Co. v. 
Anaconda Co., D. Ut., 248 F. Supp. 708 (1965), we read the followir.: 
There is an absence of good faith where the junior 
locator seeks possession solely on the basis of 
defects in the senior locator's claims. 
The Trial Court found that the boundaries of DESERT RAT 
CLAIMS and SAND VALLEY CLAIMS were not distinctly marked on the 
ground so the same can be readily traced and that discovery 
monuments were not erected and notices of location posted thereon 
for DESERT RAT CLAIMS and SAND VALLEY CLAIMS other than Desert 
Rat 3, Sand Valley, and Sand Valley 2 and 5. (Finding of Fact 
No. 5 in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated May 18, 
1979. See 30 U.S.C.A. § 28; § 40-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
19 53). 
While it is true that Roger Fluckey testified that he 
erected corner monuments and a discovery monument at which a 
notice was placed on Desert Rat 3 and that he followed "the same 
procedure in staking Desert Rat 2," Appellants' Surveyor knew 
nothing of this claim and no map of Desert Rat 2 prepared by a 
surveyor was offered by Appellants at the trial. (Transcript of 
March 23, pages 92, 93, 117, 118). The only evidence as to the 
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location of Desert Rat 2 was a free hand drawing of its "approxi-
mate" location by Mr. Fluckey on Exhibit 85. 
March 23, 1979, pages 104-106, 109, 110). 
(Transcript of 
Appellants attempt to remedy this uncertainty by making 
reference to an amended notice of location. (Appellants' Brief, 
pages 11, 12; Exhibit 82). SKIPPER prepared Exhibit 99 which 
overlays Exhibit 47 showing, among other things, Desert Rat 2 as 
shown on Exhibit 85, and Exhibit 100 which is also an overlay on 
Exhibit 47 showing Desert Rat 2 from the description in the 
amended notice. (Transcript of April 26, 1978, pages 79-86.) 
.n: These exhibits show that the amended notice describes the claim 
in a different place than where Mr. Fluckey drew it. 
With reference to SAND VALLEY CLAIMS, the only evidence of 
the erection of the monuments marking the boundaries and their 
actual location on the ground is the testimony of Hr. Fluckey 
that when locating DESERT RAT CLAIMS he was familiar with the 
boundaries of SAND VALLEY CLAIMS. (Transcript of Harch 23, 1978, 
page 90). Mr. Fluckey did not point out the location of the SAND 
VMLEY CLAIMS monuments to Appellants' surveyors, who admitted 
that they found no corner monuments and that the positions of 
SAND VALLEY CLAIMS on Exhibit 85 were "pieced together" from the 
discovery monuments found for Sand Valley, Sand Valley 2 and Sand 
Valley 5, using the amended notices of location in Exhibit 86. 
(Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 104, 112-122; Transcript of 
April 26, 1978, pages 90-95). The uncertainty of this approach 
in determining the position of SAND VALLEY CLAIMS is illustrated 
by the fact that a platting of SAND VALLEY CLAIMS from the amended 
notices (vii th discovery monuments where the descriptions say they 
are), as with Desert Rat 2, puts them in a quite different location 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 18 
than·does Exhibit 85. (Exhibits 47, 99 and 100; Transcript of 
April 26, 1978, pages 79-86). 
The only evidence of the erection of discovery monuments on 
SAND VALLEY CLAIMS is the testimony of Arther Duane Wise, one of 
Appellant's surveyors, that he and his crew found the discovery 
monument of Sand Valley with an amended notice of location in it 
and the discovery monuments of Sand Valley 2 and Sand Valley 5 
with papers in them. (Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 112-
119; Transcript of April 26, 1978, pages 90-91, 94-95. See § 40-
1-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953). 
The actual language in Dagget v. Yreka Min. & Mil. Co., 149 
Cal. 357, 86 Pac. 968 (1906), cited on page 14 of Appellants' 
Brief, is as follows: 
The only competent evidence of the marking of 
boundaries is that of witnesses who saw the monu-
ments placed, or who saw them standing after being 
placed. 
and is not inconsistent with, but rather supports the position of 
Respondent. 
Respondent submits that the burden was on Appellants to 
show, not only that the proper acts of location were accomplished 
on DESERT RAT CLAIMS and SAND VALLEY CLAIMS, but also where the 
claims were actually located on the ground with sufficient accu-
racy that the boundaries can be determined without speculation. 
Appellants did not sustain that burden. 
The Trial Court found that the discovery monument for Desert 
Rat 3 was located on Desert Moon 1, a prior valid claim which is 
part of ATLAS CLAIMS, and that the discovery monument of Sand 
Valley 6, if any, was located on Desert Moon 5, a prior valid 
claim which is part of ATLAS CLAD1S. (Findings of Fact Nos. 7 
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and 8 in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated May 18, 
1979) . 
A mining claim having its discovery monument on a prior 
valid claim is void. Watson v. Mayberry, 15 Utah 265, 49 Pac. 
479 (1897); Reynolds v. Pascoe, 24 Utah 219, 66 Pac. 1065 (1901); 
Lockhart v. Farrell, 31 Utah 155, 86 Pac. 1077 (1906). See also 
Fox v. Myers, 29 Nev. 169, 86 Pac. 793 (1906); Cram v. Church, 9 
Utah 2d 169, 340 P. 2d 1116 (1959). 
The evidence (which is not challenged by Appellants) shows 
that Desert Moon 1 and 5 were located prior to Desert Rat 3 and 
Sand Valley 6 and that the assessment work was done on Desert 
t1oon 1 and 5 for the assessment years pertinent to the dates of 
the alleged location and amended location of Desert Rat 3 and 
Sand Valley 6. (See Exhibits 56, 71, 81-82, 86, 88 and 92-97; 
Transcript of April 26, 1978, pages 9, 11-23, 27, 28, 33-41, 45-
7 5) • 
Appellants do not attack the finding of the Trial Court that 
the discovery monument of Sand Valley 6 was on Desert Moon 5, but 
do contend that the evidence does not show that the discovery 
monument of Desert Rat 3 is on Desert Moon 1. (Appellant's 
Brief, page 11). 
The evidence sustains the finding of the Lower Court in both 
instances. Exhibit 85 was identified and offered by Appellants. 
(Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 117, 118). It is a copy of 
Exhibit 1 (also Appellants' Exhibit) insofar as it shows the 
location of ATLAS CLAIMS and POWELL CLAIMS. It shows the bound-
aries of Desert Moon 1 and 5. Roger Fluckey (called by Appellants) 
testified as set forth on pages 103, 107 and 108 of the Transcript 
of March 23, 1979 as follows: 
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Q (By Mr. Frandsen) Will you come forward 
here and examine Plaintiffs' Exhibit 85, and will 
you stand over here and point out where this Desert 
Rat 3 is? 
A Desert Rat 3, right here. 
(Witness indicating.) 
Q Now, are you still pointing there to a 
claim that is labeled Desert Rat 3 and is circled 
in purple and is hatched with red lines? 
A Yes. 
Q All right now, where does that fit in 
in relation to the Atlas claims? 
A These are the Atlas claims on the west. 
(Witness indicating.) 
Q Mr. Fluckey, with reference to Desert 
Rat 3, where is the discovery monument? 
A To the north end. 
Q Would you come and indicate it on the 
map? Let's see, what color did we use? Green. 
Let's have the green. Would you point out the 
discovery monument on Desert Rat 3, and would 
you writ (sic) the words D.M. for discovery 
monument? 
A ('lvitness complied.) 
An examination of Exhibit 85 shows the green "D.M." to be 
well within the boundaries of Desert Moon 1. This is further 
demonstrated by overlaying Exhibit 99 (the transparency showing 
DESERT RAT CLAIMS and SAND VALLEY CLAIMS) on Exhibit 47. (See 
Transcript of April 26, 1978, pages 79-86). 
Even though Appellants do not question the finding with 
reference to Sand Valley 6 and even though there is no evidence 
of the erection or existence of the discovery monument on that 
claim, if it were there it would be on Desert t·1oon 5 as shown by 
overlaying Exhibit 99 on Exhibit 47. 
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The Trial Court found that the assessment work was not done 
on DESERT RAT CLAIMS and SAND VALLEY CLAIMS for the assessment 
year ending September 1, 1960 and the period between September 1, 
1960 and the 20th day of February, 1961, when Hihope 9, the last 
of HIHOPE CLAIMS was located. (Finding of Fact No. 9 in Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated May 18, 1979). Appellants 
do not challenge the finding with reference to the latter period. 
Appellants' offered proof of assessment work done on DESERT 
AAT CLAIMS for the assessment year ending September 1, 1960 in 
the form of testimony of Roger Fluckey, the locator, on direct 
examination, that one hole was drilled on Desert Rat 2 and one 
hole on Desert Rat 3, that he guessed each hole was between 80 to 
100 feet deep and that he remeffiPered that the average cost of 
drilling was $0.85 to $1.25 a foot. (Transcript of Harch 23, 
1978, pages 98, 99). On cross examination he said that he couldn't 
remember but the depth was around 80 feet. (Transcript of March 
23, 1978, page 110.) On redirect the witness said he was "making 
a wild guess" on direct and cross, that he was guessing and did 
not know exactly, and that 80 feet would be the minimum and 150 
feet the maximum depth of each hole. 
1978, pages llO-lll.) 
(Transcript of March 23, 
No other assessment work was claimed as is evidenced by the 
fact that an Affidavit of Labor and Improvement was executed and 
recorded by Mr. Fluckey for five claims (including DESERT RAT 
2LAH1S) and the two drill holes described above were the entire 
issessment work claimed for the claims listed in the affidavit. 
(Exhibit 84; Transcript of r1arch 23, 1978, page 110). 
Respondent does not quarrel with the general rule on burden 
Jf proof in Hammer v. Garfield, 130 U.S. 291, 32 L.Ed. 964 (1889) 
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and McCulloch v. Murphy, Cir.Ct., D.Nev., 125 Fed. 147 (1903), 
cited on page 13 of Appellants' Brief with reference to the 
alleged assessment work on DESERT RAT CLAIMS, as applied to those 
cases which involved a contest (unlike the particular issue 
involved here) between prior and subsequent conflicting locators 
in which the latter claimed the former had not done the required 
work. Appellants also correctly cite the statutory requirement 
in 30 U.S.C.A. § 28 on page 12 of their brief that $100.00 worth 
of labor is required for each claim during annual assessment 
periods now ending on September 1. However, the proof that work 
having the required value was not done on DESERT RAT CLAIMS is 
clear and convincing. If the minimum figures given by Mr. Fluckey 
(80 feet per hole and a price of $0.85 per foot) are accepted, 
there is only $68.00 "worth of labor" for each claim. 
There are two principles which defeat Appellants' contention 
regarding the assessment work on DESERT RAT CLAIMS that the 
median of the figures on the depth of the holes and price per 
foot should be used. (See page 13 of Appellants' Brief). First 
is the holding of Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 P.2d 986 
(1954), that testimony on cross examination that defendant was 
going anywhere from 25 to 30 miles per hour is not evidence that 
defendant was traveling faster than 25 miles per hour. Applying 
this rule, the testimony of Mr. Fluckey is only evidence that 
$68.00 worth of labor was performed on each of DESERT RAT CLAIMS. 
Second is the rule of review in Rummell v. Bailey, supra. Viewing 
the testimony of Mr. Fluckey in the light most favorable to the 
finding of the Trial Court only the minimum depth and value can 
be considered. 
Appellants attempted to prove that assessment work in the 
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form of drilling was done on SAND VALLEY CLAIMS for the assess-
ment year ending September 1, 1960 with the testimony of Mr. 
warren Thurston. (Appellants' Brief, page 15). Appellants, in 
their Brief, do not claim any mining as assessment work and, at 
the trial, did not offer any proof in that regard. 
The following from the Transcript of April 26, 1978, estab-
lishes that Mr. Thurston's testimony is ineffective in showing 
that sufficient drilling was done to satisfy the requirement of 
30 u.s.c.A., § 28, to-wit: 
Q Did you do drilling for the Welch 
Hining Company? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q 
1961? 
Did you do drilling during 1960 and 
A Nell, I couldn't exactly tell you the 
years that I done the drilling and the actual 
years that I was working in the mine. 
(Page 98, Lines 8-12.) 
Q Calling your attention to the year 1960, 
did you do drilling in this area where this re-
servoir is in the Wayne Smith corral for Welch? 
A Yes, I did, as near as I can recollect. 
Q Do you know how much drilling you did? 
A No. 
(Page 102, Lines 10-15.) 
The Trial Court was justified in finding that the required 
mrk was not done. 
Appellants assert, on page 15 of their Brief, that Exhibit 
89, the recorded affidavit with reference to SAND VALLEY CLAIMS, 
~d others, "supports the testimony of Mr. Thurston." Respondent 
subrni ts that since Mr. Thurston's testimony does not show the 
'·lork was done, support of that testimony adds nothing. 
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Further, the Trial Court found that the recorded affidavits 
on DESERT RAT CLAIMS and SAND VALLEY CLAIMS (Exhibits 84 and 89) 
do not show the following required by § 40-1-6, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, to-wit: 
A. The number of days' work done. 
B. The character and value of the improvements 
placed on the claims. 
c. The number of cubic feet of earth or rock 
removed. 
D. The actual amount paid for the labor and im-
provements and by whom paid. 
E. That notices were posted as required by § 
40-1-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
and concluded that Exhibits 84 and 89 are not prima facie evidence 
that the work was done. (Finding of Fact No. 10 and Conclusion 
of Law No. 3 in Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated Hay 
18, 1979). This finding is not challenged by Appellants in their 
Brief. (See Upton v. Santa Rita Mining Co., supra; McKnight v. 
El Paso Brick Co., 16 N.M. 721, 120 Pac. 694 (1911). 
Under the now familiar rule of review in Rummell v. Bailey, 
supra, there is no basis to reverse the finding of the Lower 
Court that when ATLAS CLAIMS were located, the land was open to 
location. (Finding of Fact No. 4 in Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law dated May 18, 1979). 
ANSWER TO APPELLANTS' POINT III--THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 
IN FINDING THAT THE REQUIRED ASSESSMENT WORK WAS DONE ON ATLAS 
CLAIMS SO AS TO PRECLUDE THE RELOCATION OF THE SAME BY APPELLANTS. 
Appellants concede, on appeal, that the assessment work was 
done on ATLAS CLAIMS for all the critical periods except the 
years ending on September 1, in 1973, 1974 and 1975. (Appellants' 
Brief, pages 24, 25). The amount of work done during each of the 
questioned years was greatly in excess of $11,400.00 ($100.00 for 
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each of 114 claims) and Appellants admit that the amount was 
sufficient. (This Brief, pages 7-10; Appellants' Brief, page 
46). However, Appellants contend that the actual work was not 
done during those critical years on the particular ATLAS CLAIMS 
which Appellants sought to relocate and that the work done on 
oilier ATLAS CLAIMS did not benefit, so as to qualify as assess-
ment work, the particular claims in conflict. 
Exhibit 47 shows (and Appellants do not dispute) that ATLAS 
CLAIMS are one contiguous group. 
The statements on page 27 of Appellants' Brief that the 
drilling represented by green dots on Exhibit 58 extended approxi-
mately 2 miles is not accurate. The scale on Exhibit 58 is the 
s~e as on Exhibit 47, 1 inch equals 600 feet. A simple measure-
ment on Exhibit 58 shows that each line of green dots is about 
7,500 feet. Pages 28-31, 41, and 42 of Appellants' Brief list 
alleged distances between the work done on ATLAS CLAIMS and 
POWELL CLAIMS. Respondent submits that the distance between the 
place of the work on ATLAS CLAIMS and POWELL CLAIMS is totally 
irrelevant. The distance between the place where the work was 
done on ATLAS CLAIMS and the particular ATLAS CLAIMS which Appel-
lants sought to relocate may have some relevance. Assuming that 
this is what Appellants are trying to show, Respondent submits 
that while precise mathematical measurement of distances is not 
critical to a determination of the issues, Appellants' Brief does 
not accurately state the distances. One example will suffice. 
Page 28 of Appellants' Brief asserts that the closest hole drilled 
~ CONOCO in February and March, 1973 is one mile from the nearest 
of PO\'i'ELL CLAIMS. Exhibit 58 and Exhibit 4 7 show that one of the 
coles is about 1, 000 feet from Hihope 1 (one of ATLAS CLAIMS 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 26 
sought to be relocated by Appellants). (See this Brief, page 8). 
The drilling done by CONOCO for the assessment year ending 
September 1, 1974 was performed in October and November, 1973, 
prior to the location of any POWELL CLAIMS (the first of which 
was located in January, 1974) which Appellants now assert to be 
valid. (See pages 7-8 of this Brief and page 29 of Appellants' 
Brief). This, even if the work was not done in the prior assess-
ment year, (and it was in fact done), the work in October and 
November, 1973 amounted to a resumption of the work on ATLAS 
CLAIMS which would preclude the relocation of the same by POWELL 
CLAIMS. Belk v. Meagher, 104 U.S. 279 (1881); Pharis v. Huldoon, 
75 Cal. 284, 17 Pac. 70 (1888); Klopenstine v. Hays, 20 Utah 45, 
57 Pac. 712 (1899); Strattan v. Raine, 45 Nev. 10, 197 Pac. 695 
(1921); Herbert v. Bond, 56 S.D. 220, 228 N.W. 185 (1929); Whitwell 
v. Goodsell, 37 Ariz. 451, 295 Pac. 318 (1931); Hartman Gold 
Mining Co. v. Warning, 40 Ariz. 267, 11 P.2d 854 (1932); Pidgeon 
v. Lamb, 133 Cal. App. 342, 24 P.2d 206 (1933); Ickes v. Virginia 
Colorado Development Corporation, 295 u.s. 639, 55 S.Ct. 888, 79 
L.Ed. 1627 (1934); New Mercur Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining 
Co., 101 Utah 131, 128 P.2d 269 (1942), cert. denied 319 U.S. 
753, 63 S.Ct. 1162, 87 L.Ed. 1707; Knight v. Flat Top Mining Co., 
6 Utah 2d 51, 305 P.2d 503 (1957); Featherston v. Howse, D.Ark., 
151 F. Supp. 353 (1957). Therefore, all the drilling done by 
CONOCO in calendar year 1973 should be considered with reference 
to POWELL CLAIMS located from January through May, 1974. 
The question in this case goes to the sufficiency of the 
assessment work done on ATLAS CLAIMS for the assessment years 
ending September 1 in 1973, 1974 and 1975, and more particularly, 
whether the work done on ATLAS CLAIMS was of "benefit" (as that 
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term is defined in the applicable cases) to the entire group of 
claims and particularly to those claims which Appellants sought 
to relocate. 
The pertinent language of 30 U.S.C.A., § 28 (which has not 
changed since its adoption) is as follows: 
On each claim ••• , and until a patent has been issued 
therefore, not less than $100 worth of labor shall be 
performed or improvements made during each year •••• 
Where such claims are held in common, such expenditures 
may be made on any one claim. 
See Chambers v. Harrington, 111 U.S. 353, 4 S. Ct. 428, 28 L'.Ed. 
452 (1884). 
Justice Sawyer, in Mount Diablo M. & M. Company v. Callison, 
Cir. Ct., D. Nev., 5 Sawyer 439, 17 Fed. Cases, Case No. 9886 
(1879), said: 
"Work done outside of the claim •.. , if done for the 
purpose and as a means of prospecting or developing 
the claim, ••• is as available as if done within the 
boundaries of the claim itself. One general system 
may be formed well adapted and intended to work several 
contiguous claims ..• , and where such is the case work 
in furtherance of the system is work on the claims 
intended to be developed. 
In Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 26 L.Ed. 875 (1881) 
we read the following: 
Long before patents were allowed--indeed from the earliest 
period in which mining for gold and silver was pursued as 
a business--miners were in the habit of consolidating ad-
joining claims, whether they consisted of one or more orig-
inal locations, into one for convenience and economy in 
working them. . 
Labor and improvements, within the meaning of the statute, 
are deemed to have been had on a mining claim, whether 
it consists of one location or several, when the labor 
is performed or the improvements are made for its develop-
ment, that is, to facilitate the extraction of the metals 
it may contain, though in fact such labor and improvements 
may be on ground which originally constituted one of the 
locations, as in sinking a shaft, or be at a distance from 
the claim itself, as where the labor is performed for the 
turning of a stream, or the introduction of water, where 
the improvement consists in the construction of a flume to 
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carry off the debris or waste material. 
In Jupiter Mining Co. v. Bodie Consolidated Mining Co., Cir. 
Ct., D. Cal., 11 Fed. 666, 7 Sawy. 96 (1881), the instruction 
given to the jury by Chief Justice Sawyer included the following: 
With regard to the work required to be done in order to 
hold a claim, the jury are further instructed that where 
one person or company owns several contiguous or adjoining 
claims capable or being advantageously worked together, 
one general system may be adopted to work such claims •... 
When such a system is adopted, work in furtherance of the 
system is work on the claims intended to be developed by 
it. Work done outside of the claims, or outside of any 
claim, if done for the purpose and as a means of prospecting 
or working the claim, is as available for holding the claim 
as if done within the boundaries of the claim itself. 
In Jackson v. Roby, 109 U.S. 440, 3 S. Ct. 301, 27 L. Ed. 
990 (1883), the only assessment work claimed was that of con-
structing a flume from the adjoining claims which carried tailings 
from the adjoining claims to the claim in question to the extent 
that the tailings covered more than one-third of the claim in 
question. Justice Field, who also wrote the opinion in Smelting 
Co. v. Kemp, supra, quoted the language cited above from that 
case and said: 
In other words, the law permits a general system to be 
adopted for adjoining claims held in common, and in such 
cases the expenditures required may be made, or the labor 
be performed, upon any one of them. 
Here no work was done for the general improvement of all 
claims. The deposit of the debris from the Lomax Gulch 
(the adjoining claims) on the premises in controversy, 
so far from tending to develop them, imposed obstacles 
in the way of their development, by covering them up with 
refuse matter. 
This brings us to the leading case of Harrington v. Chambers, 
3 Utah 94, 1 Pac. 362 (1882), in which the trial court adopted 
findings of the referee that work on a main shaft on one claim 
"with a view to the future working and development" of two addi-
tional claims had a tendency to develop all three claims and was 
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proper assessment work. 
The Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah affirmed the 
decision and said, in part, as follows: 
The second point urged upon our attention relates to that 
portion of the fifth finding of fact, which states that 
the main shaft of the Lady of the Lake is in such proximity 
to said Parley's Park mining claim, that work in it has 
a tendency to develop said claim. It is claimed by the 
appellants that there is no evidence to support this part 
of the finding. The testimony uncontradicted established 
as a fact, as stated in the finding, that the owners of 
the Parley's Park claim were also the owners of two certain 
claims, called respectively the "Central" and "Lady of the 
Lake," the Central adjoining the Parley's Park, and the 
Lady of the Lake adjoining the Central mining claim, and 
with a view to the future working and development of all 
three of said claims, the owners thereof located what is 
called the "main shaft" in the Lady of the Lake surface 
ground. The testimony was also uncontradicted as to the 
object for which the shaft was located, and its relative 
location; it was further shown upon the maps put in evidence. 
It is true, no witness testified in the exact words of 
the finding objected to, nor was this necessary in order to 
support the finding. The portion of the finding objected to 
is a statement of the ultimate facts found by the referee 
from this uncontradicted testimony, and is warranted by 
the facts and circumstances in proof .••. 
The testimony in the case before us leaves no room for 
doubt, and such is the express finding of the referee that 
the work in question was done for the express purpose of 
developing the three claims owned by the respondents, one 
of which is the Parley's Park, and .•• is as available for 
holding that claim as if done on the claim itself. 
This case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court 
(Chambers v. Harrington, supra) which affirmed, quoting with 
approval the above language from Mount Diablo M. & M. Company v. 
Callison, supra, and Jackson v. Roby, supra. The Court also 
said: 
It is equally clear that in such case the claims must be 
contiguous, so that each claim thus associated may in 
some way be benefitted by the work done on one of them. 
Book v. Justice Min. Co., Cir. Ct., D. Nev., 58 Fed. 106 
!1893), involved work done on one tunnel commenced outside of 
:hree adjoining claims and on another commenced on one of the 
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claims. The court held these to be sufficient and said: 
When such work is done for the avowed and express purpose 
of prospecting two or more claims held in common, as was 
the case here, the courts have always held that such work 
was to be credited to such claims. This is always deemed 
to be a sufficient compliance with the provisions of the 
mining laws of the United States. 
It is well to briefly summarize the development of the law 
from the above cases (that is, up to and including Book v. Justice 
Min. Co., supra, in 1893). 
The proposition that work done on one claim can serve as 
work on another was well established. Mount Diablo M. & M. 
Company v. Callison, supra (1879); Smelting Co. v. Kemp, supra 
(1881); Jupiter Mining Co. v. Bodie Consolidated Mining Co., 
supra (1881); Jackson v. Roby, supra (1883); Chambers v. Harring-
ton, supra (1884); Book v. Justice Min. Co., supra (1893). The 
1872 Mining Law and these cases were a statutory and judicial 
confirmation of a practice existing among miners prior to the 
adoption of the 1872 Mining Law. Smelting Co. v. Kemp, supra; 
Chambers v. Harrington, supra. 
The opinion of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah in 
Harrington v. Chambers, supra, affirmed a finding that the work 
had "a tendency to develop" the adjoining claim and held that the 
requirement is met if the work is done for the "express purpose 
of developing" all the claims in the group and also held that 
such might be inferred. The United States Supreme Court in 
Chambers v. Harrington, supra, in affirming the Utah decision, 
stated that "the claims must be contiguous, so that each 
may in some way be benefited ." and reaffirmed the state-
ments in the earlier cases to the effect that "the law permits a 
general system to be adopted for adjoining claims." 
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We now move to an examination of subsequent cases. Wilson 
v. Triumph Consolidated Mining Co., supra, speaks in terms of 
"consolidation" of adjoining claims for "development and working 
purposes", and Klopenstine v. Hays, supra, holds the work on one 
claim sufficient to hold other claims without explanation. 
Fissure Co. v. Old Susan Co., 22 Utah 438, 63 Pac. 587 (1900), 
incorporates some of the language of the earlier cases stating 
that "the claims were consolidated or worked for development 
purposes", that the "work was done to apply on" all the claims, 
and that the "work was of benefit to all claims." 
This Court came squarely to grips with the issue of how work 
on one claim had to relate to adjoining claims in order to meet 
the requirements of the statute in Nevada Exploration and Mining 
Co. v. Spriggs, 41 Utah 171, 124 Pac. 770 (1912). In that case, 
the trial court found the work sufficient. The crucial facts, as 
stated in the dissent of Justice Straup, are as follows: 
Respondents claimed 7 or 8 claims. They did work on one 
which they claim inured to and was for the benefit of all. 
The work done by them on the one claim was the sinking of 
a shaft about 122 feet deep, one or two short drifts, and 
the running of a tunnel 114 feet long. This work, most 
of which was done after appellant's location, is claimed 
inured to the benefit of the 6 or 7 other claims, tended 
to develop them and to discover mineral therein, and 
facilitated the extraction of ore therefrom. It is shown 
that to extend the tunnel to such claims and to the area 
in conflict would require the tunnel to be extended a 
distance of from 3,700 to 4,500 feet and that, when the 
tunnel is so extended, a depth on such claims of only 54 
feet would be attained. Hhile so-called experts testified 
that in their opinion the work inured to the benefit and to 
development of such claims, yet, when asked on what facts 
such opinions were based, their answers, in my judgment, 
disclosed none. It is not shown that the vein on the claim 
on which the work was done is the same vein on the claims 
alleged to be benefited by such work. I think what evidence 
there is on the subject shows the contrary. It is almost 
inconceivable that a tunnel 3,700 or 4,500 feet through 
solid rock will be or ever was intended to be extended 
to such claims to reach a depth of only 64 feet. It is 
not made to appear how the sinking of the shaft on the 
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one claim tended to discover or explore mineral on the 
other claims 3,000 to 4,000 feet away, or facilitated its 
extraction therefrom. The physical features and relative 
positions of gulches and mountains render that impractical, 
if not impossible. 
In spite of this, the majority of this Court affirmed, 
saying: 
The next proposition argued is that the court erred in 
finding that respondents had done the requisite amount 
of assessment work and had made the necessary amount of 
improvements to entitle them to a patent for the mining 
claims in dispute. It is contended that the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain such findings. The principal 
objection in this regard is that the work, which con-
sisted of sinking a shaft and running drifts therefrom, 
was not calculated either to prospect or to develop the 
entire group of mining claims, or any considerable part 
thereof, because the shaft in question was too far distant 
from some of the claims, and because the drift, even if 
run from the shaft, would not reach an appreciable depth 
below the surface because the elevation of the claims was 
not much above the elevation of the shaft. There is some 
direct and positive evidence from expert miners and mining 
engineers in the record that the shaft and the drifts as 
constructed tended to develop the whole group of claims, 
and that the work was also proper as prospecting work. 
We think the trial court was right in not substituting 
his own judgment for that of the mining men and engineers. 
The courts should be very slow, indeed, in holding that 
certain work is not calculated to develop certain mining 
claims, or is not proper prospecting work, when there is 
competent evidence that such is the effect of the work 
in question, and where there is no evidence to the con-
trary. 
The Court then cited Chambers v. Harrington, supra, and said 
further: 
But counsel insists that there is no proof that respondents 
had in fact adopted a general system, or any system, for 
the development of their claims. We think that it is not 
necessary for a claimant to prepare plans and specifications 
with regard to how he intends to develop his claims. The 
purpose of the law is to require claimants to do such work 
or to make such improvements as may be said are calculated 
to prospect the claims, or that will develop the mineral in 
the claims, or will facilitate the extraction of the mineral 
found therein. In many instances, if a fixed plan were 
adopted in advance of exploration, it, for obvious reasons, 
would have to be departed from before pursuing it many days, 
and in all cases where veins were found, the strike of which 
was in a direction different from that in which they wer2 
assumed to be, the entire plan would necessarily have to be 
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changed. We think that what is intended by the use of the 
term "system" or "general system" of work means simply this: 
That the work, as it is commenced on the ground, is such 
that, if continued, will lead to a discovery and development 
of the veins or ore bodies that are supposed to be in the 
claims, or, if these are known, that the work will facilitate 
the extraction of the ores and mineral. 
In Love v. Mt. Oddie United Mines Co., 43 Nev. 61, 184 Pac. 
921 (1919) the assessment work for eight claims was done on a 
shaft on one claim. There was conflicting evidence as to whether 
or not the work benefitted the entire group. The jury and trial 
court rendered a verdict and judgment for the relocator. The 
trial court gave an instruction to the jury "that where work is 
done upon one claim for the benefit of the entire group, it 'must 
manifestly tend' to the development of all the claims in the 
group." The Supreme Court of Nevada held that this instruction 
was in error, that there was not evidence to sustain the judgment, 
and reversed the trial court. 
The following excerpts from the court's opinion are helpful 
here, to-wit: 
The trial judge, in his written decision, cited Section 
630 of Lindley on Mines in support of his views. He no 
doubt accepted the statement of Mr. Lindley without having 
examined the authorities cited by that eminent author in 
support of the text, as was most natural, in view of the 
arduous labors incident to his position; and, while we 
entertain great deference for the views of Mr. Lindley, 
we cannot accept his statement of the law. Ne have ex-
amined the decisions of the various courts cited and do 
not find that they support the author; nor do we see how 
such a view can be sustained. The word "manifest" means 
"evident to the senses; evident to the mind; obvious to 
the mind." Webster's Int. Diet. The courts uniformly 
hold that annual labor may be done outside of a claim, 
or group of claims, upon a patented mining claim, or upon 
the public domain. Certainly work done outside of a 
claim, upon a patented mining claim, or upon the public 
domain, cannot be said to "manifestly" tend to develop 
such claims; but it is the universal rule that proof may 
be offered to show that such work was done for the pur-
pose of developing such other claims, and that in fact 
it tends to develop them, and when so shown it complies 
with all requirements. If it were the rule that the work 
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"must manifestly" tend to develop a group of claims, work 
done on the public domain could not count, as by no possible 
stretch of the imagination, could it be said that such 
work would "manifestly" tend to develop such group, nor 
could proof cause it to "manifestly" so appear. The correct 
rule to apply to the situation here presented is declared 
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Smelting Co. 
v. Kemp, 104 U.S. 636, 26 L. Ed. 875 •.•• 
It may be said that it is the policy of the law to encourage 
the doing of annual labor on mining claims in a manner 
which will best develop the property and lead to the dis-
covery of mineral, and for that reason annual labor upon 
a group of mining claims may be done all in one place, 
the object of the government being to encourage such 
development as is most likely to result in the production 
of the precious minerals; and since depth is usually 
necessary in the making of a mine, it is much better, as 
a general rule, to spend $800 in one place than to dis-
tribute $800 in eight or more places, provided it is done 
in an honest effort to make a mine, and in a manner tending 
to develop all of the claims. And in the exercise of judg-
ment as to where work should be done, we think a wide latitud 
should be allowed the owners of property, consisting of 
several claims, as to where the work shall be done to 
develop a group of claims. And in this view we are sus-
tained by ample authority. In Big Three M & M Co. v. 
Hamilton, supra, (157 Cal. 130, 107 Pac. 304, 137 lun. St. 
Rep. 118 (1909)), it was said: 
"Work done on one of a group of mining claims which 
has a tendency to develop or benefit all of the claims in 
said group inures to the benefit of each and all of said 
claims, even though the system adopted may not be the 
best that could have been devised under the circumstances." 
Judge Farrington, in Wailes v. Davies (C.C.) 158 Fed. 667, 
in determining a case in which the question before us was 
involved said: 
"The statute does not require * * * that the work shall 
be wisely and judiciously done." 
Miehlich v. Tintic Standard Mining Co., 60 Utah 569, 211 
Pac. 686 (1922), with some similarities to Love v. !1t. Oddie 
United Mines Co., supra, was a logical extension of Nevada Explor· 
ation and Mining Co. v. Spriggs, supra, and further clarified 
what this Court said in the earlier cases. A large number of 
claims were involved. There were two factors in this case which 
were not present in Nevada Exploration. First, there was sharplY 
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conflicting evidence as to whether the work in question tended to 
develop the distant claim. Second, the trial court found that 
the work did not develop the distant (2,000 feet) claim (Grey-
hound No. 5). Now this Court had to decide what it meant in 
Nevada Exploration in saying that it would not substitute its 
judgment for that of the miner. 
The Court confirmed the language in Nevada Exploration and 
extended it to its logical conclusion by reversing the trial 
court on the grounds that the Court would not substitute its 
judgment for that of the miner, since there was evidence in the 
record to support the contention that the work did tend to develop 
l; the distant claim, even though sharply disputed by other evidence 
and even though the trial court chose to believe the contrary 
evidence. 
The following excerpts from the opinion of the Court are 
particularly pertinent here, to-wit: 
As opposed to the defendant's testimony bearing upon the 
question whether the work done tended to develop the Grey-
hound No. 5 is the testimony of the expert witness R. H. 
Strickland, who gave it as his opinion that it did not 
tend to develop the Greyhound No. 5. He gave it as his 
opinion that there was some faulting between where ores 
had actually been found in the workings of the Standard 
Mine and the Greyhound No. 5, and geological conditions 
generally showed that the work done on the group did not 
support the defendant's contention that the work done 
tended to develop the Greyhound No. 5. In the light of 
what has been actually demonstrated in the extensive 
mine workings on the defendant's group of claims, it 
would seem the opinions of expert geologists ought not 
be particularly persuasive in arriving at the fact to be 
determined. The evidence shows and the trial court found, 
that during some years since the location of the Greyhound 
No. 5 the drifts projected from the shafts on the defendant's 
group of claims were in a northwesterly direction, and away 
from the Greyhound No. 5. The trial court in making that 
finding or arriving at that conclusion seems to have lost 
sight of the fact that during those years the work, never-
theless, was actually done upon and within the confines of 
the defendant's group of cl~ims; that all of the claims are 
in a mineralized country, and within the same mineral zone; 
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that the most economical and practical way to develop their 
mineral resources was the sinking of shafts to attain depth 
and then run drifts in any direction in which there would 
be a likelihood of finding ore, not necessarily in the 
direction of every claim composing the group, but in any 
way that experience and good judgment of a practical miner 
would dictate in order to intercept ore veins or ore 
channels and attain a knowledge of underground conditions, 
and where deposits of ore are likely to be found. The mere 
fact that drifts are not projected from a shaft toward a 
particular claim some one year is no indication that ore 
channels, when found in some other claim, will not in course 
of time be followed or that they will not lead into that 
claim. The very purpose of the government in granting 
mineral rights to the citizen is to have the mineral re-
sources of the country developed. The ·statutes do not 
attempt to prescribe the manner in which work shall be 
done upon a mining claim in order to protect theminer's 
rights. If the labor tends to develop the mineral re-
sources of the claim, that satisfies the law. Horeover, 
the courts will never substitute their judgment for that 
of the practical miner acting in good faith while expending 
his money and labor for the development of a group of 
mining claims as has the trial court in this instance. 
Thus, the law in Utah has developed so that the test is one 
of good faith, and the work is sufficient if there is competent 
evidence of benefit, even though an expert witness may appear at 
trial and express his opinion that the work was not of any bene-
fit to a particular claim or group of claims in the group. This 
is also the rule in other jurisdictions. See for example, Great 
Eastern Mines, Inc. v. Hetals Corp., 86 N.M. 717, 527 P.2d 112 
(1974). 
Appellants do not specifically challenge the good faith of 
Respondent and its predecessors in connection with the assessment 
work in question except with an oblique reference to the effect 
of inflation and the energy crisis on the assessment work re-
quirement. (Appellants' Brief, page 17). Appellants, admit that 
the required amounts (and much more) of work were done. (Appel-
lants' Brief, pages 26, 30, 46; this Brief, pages 7-9, 24, 25). 
The good faith of Respondent and its predecessor cannot be 
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successfully questioned. ATLAS CLAIMS have been consolidated 
into one group or unit for purposes of exploring, developing, 
working and operating the same and doing the assessment work 
thereon extending back as far as 1945, when the first of ATLAS 
CLAIMS were located--a period in excess of thirty years. The 
entire record in this case and particularly the work done as 
shown by Defendant's Exhibits 71, 94, 95 and 96 show that a 
tremendous amount of work has been done over wide-spread areas of 
this property and that there was "bona fide intention to develop 
the land and use the mineral resources" so as to meet the defini-
tion of good faith in Chamber lain v. Han tgomery, 1 Utah 2d 31, 
261 P.2d 942 (1953). Mr. Dearth testified that ATLAS has invested 
much money in the area. (Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 71, 
72.) Extensive mining and drilling operations have been conducted 
by ATLAS on ATLAS CLAIMS (Exhibits 59-68, 71, 73-75, 80, 92-93). 
That the "good faith" test was used by this Court in its 
subsequent decisions is indicated by Utah Standard Mining Co. v. 
Tintic Indian Chief Mining and Milling Co., 73 Utah 456, 274 Pac. 
950 (1929), in which defendant's 22 claims were located prior to 
plaintiff's ten claims. At least $930.00 in assessment work 
(consisting of the extension of a tunnel on one claim and building 
a road to the group of claims) was done during the critical 
assessment year on defendant's claims. The trial court found 
that the assessment work had not been done. This Court reversed 
and remanded for a new trial on the grounds that "the defendant 
Performed enough work to do the annual labor on nine claims out 
of the 13 involved in the conflict area." It seems clear that 
!lad the amount of work been sufficient, the court would have had 
~o hesitancy in applying it to the entire group of claims. 
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In New Mercur Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining Co., supra, 
discussed on pages 21, 22 and 33 of Appellants' Brief, plaintiff 
owned 12 claims leased to Snyder Mines Inc. for which the assess-
ment work in question was done by "leasers" under Snyder in a 
tunnel on adjoining property owned by another party and also 
leased by Snyder. The trial court held the assessment work was 
sufficient and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. The Court ex-
pressly followed the principles laid down in Chambers v. Harring-
ton, supra; Klopenstine v. Hays, supra; \'Tilson v. Triumph Consoli-
dated Mining Co., supra; Nevada Exploration and Mining Co. v. 
Spriggs, supra; and Fissure Co. v. Old Susan Co., supra. 
Because the work was done, not on one contiguous group of 
claims as in the case at hand, but on another group of claims in 
which the owner of the contested claims had no interest, the 
issue with which this Court was most concerned in New Mercur was 
the question of the "community of interest." The Court was 
endeavoring to set some standards as to when work done on one 
group of claims with one ownership woula qualify as assessment 
work on another group of claims with different ownership. The 
statements in the opinion about "burden of proof", "plans", 
"systems" and "intent" must be viewed in that light. That this 
is a valid distinction is suggested in Simmons v. Muir, 75 Wyo. 
44, 291 P. 2d 810 (1955). 
Although the facts of New Mercur are distinguishable from 
this case, a careful reading of the opinion, with particular 
attention to the evidence from which the Court found a "system", 
"plan", and "intent", and the Court's approval of the rules in 
the earlier cases (which are directly in point here), leads to 
the conclusion that New Mercur strongly supports Respondent's 
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position. 
Appellants, on page 24 of their Brief, state their version 
of the law as follows: 
... (T)he burden is on the owner to clearly show that the 
work in question, pr~or to ~ts performance, was intended, 
under a general plan or scheme, as the assessment work 
upon each claim and that the work manifestly tended to 
benefit each of the claims. 
The foregoing is not an accurate statement of the law in Utah 
under the cases discussed on pages 27-38 of this Brief. · 
Respondent is unable to find any authority in Appellants' 
Brief for the proposition that the owner has the burden to "clearly 
show" that the work meets the requirements. The Utah cases do 
not contain this language, but rather uphold testimony which 
"tends to show", and also hold that the Court will not substitute 
its judgment for that of the miner acting in good faith and that 
it will indulge in every reasonable presumption in favor of 
upholding the validity of the work. Wilson v. Triumph Consoli-
dated Mining Co., supra; Fissure Co. v. Old Susan Co., supra; 
Nevada Exploration and Mining Co. v. Spriggs, supra; Miehlich v. 
Tin tic Standard Mining Co. , supra. See also Simmons v. Muir, 
supra. This latter approach was most recently demonstrated by 
this Court in Albrecht v. Uranium Services, Inc., Case No. 15996, 
596 P. 2d 1025 (1979). 
Further, the requirement of a "prior general plan or scheme" 
'1/as expressly rejected in Nevada Exploration and Mining Co. v. 
Spriggs, supra, which holding was reaffirmed in New Mercur 
~ing Co. v. South Mercur Mining Co., supra. 
Parker v. Belle Fourche Bentonite Products Company, 64 Wyo. 
269, 189 P.2d 882 (1948), is cited by Appellants in support of 
~eir contention that the work must "manifestly tend" to develop 
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all the claims. Simmons v. Muir, supra, shows the tendency of 
the Wyoming Court to limit the holding of Parker. In any event, 
the Utah cases of Chambers v. Harrington, supra; Nevada Explora-
tion and Mining Co. v. Spriggs, supra; Miehlich v. Tintic Standard 
Mining Co., supra, and New Mercur Mining Co. v. South Mercur 
Mining Co., supra, do not use the word "manifestly" but rather 
hold that the test is whether the work "tends to develop." The 
use of the latter standard and the facts and holdings of the Utah 
cases indicate that this Court, like the Nevada Court in Love v. 
Mt. Oddie United Mines, supra, has rejected the language used in 
Parker. 
The work must be intended to benefit the entire group, but 
this is shown here by the assessment affidavits in Exhibit 77 
which state that the work done on ATLAS CLAIMS as a "contiguous 
group under common leasehold or ownership" was claimed as 
assessment work and from the fact that the work actually bene-
fitted all the claims. 
The real issue is whether, under the standard used in the 
Utah cases, there is sufficient evidence to sustain the finding 
of the Trial Court that the work in question did benefit each of 
ATLAS CLAIMS. 
Appellants concede that for the assessment year ending 
September 1, 1975, mining was done within 1,500 feet of Hihope 
and 8 which were the only claims Appellants sought to relocate 
(with Yellow Sand 13) for that period; that under their interpre-
tation, "benefit" from mining extended 1,500 to 2,000 feet; but 
contend that the mining was not headed toward the conflict area 
and therefore was of no benefit. (Appellants' Brief, pages 35, 
42, 46, 47; this Brief, page 10). The mining was done on Katy 1 
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and Johnny Boy 1 in Mine No. 11 as shown on Exhibit 71. (See 
page 9 of. this Brief). Appellants do not give any reference to 
the transcript or exhibits in support of their contention that 
the workings of the mine run in the opposite direction. Even if 
Appellants' assumption as to direction is correct, their contention 
was made and expressly rejected in Miehlich v. Tintic Standard 
Mining Co., supra. New Mercur Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining 
~, supra, did not involve that issue because the tunnel on the 
property adjacent to the contiguous group in question was headed 
toward the latter claims. 
Appellants admit that Albert E. Dearth, whose qualifications 
they do not question, testified that the work in question did 
benefit the claims in question, but they attack that testimony on 
several grounds. (See Appellants Brief, pages 32, 43, 46, 45; 
this Brief, pages 9-10). 
Appellants complain that Mr. Dearth was an "interested 
party" and emphasize the "independence" of their experts. (Appel-
lants Brief, pages 32, 36, 44, 45). This argument goes to the 
credibility of the witness. Appellants do not claim Mr. Dearth's 
testimony was inadmissable. Credibility was for the trier of the 
facts to determine. Cranford v. Gibbs, supra. Judge Harding 
might well have seen fit to accept the testimony of Mr. Dearth 
because he had been involved in a direct way in a geologic 
evaluation of the area where ATLAS CLAIMS are situated from 
April, 1962 to the present, as against Appellants' witnesses, Mr. 
Davis, who made only limited visits to the property and Mr. 
~llion, who had not had any contact with the area since 1956, 
and neither of whom had ever had any direct involvement with 
and/or responsibility for development or mining operations in the 
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area. (Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 69, 73, 144-146, 160-
162; Transcript of March 24, 1979, pages 6, 23, 25-27). Judge 
Harding might also have felt what was expressed by this Court in 
Miehlich v. Tintic Standard Mining Co., supra, as set forth on 
page 36 of this Brief, to the effect that in "the light of ..• ex-
tensive mine workings ••• the opinion of expert geologists ought 
not to be particularly persuasive •.•• " Further, Judge Harding 
probably recognized that while there were differences among the 
geologists who testified, the fundamental difference (as is 
demonstrated on pages 44-48 of this Brief) was in the definition 
given the word "benefit" rather than on the facts and the con-
clusions to be drawn from those facts. 
Appellants complain because Mr. Dearth testified in "retro-
spect" and "after the fact" and did not tell of the "existence of 
any type of prior plan, interest or scheme." {Appellants' Brief, 
pages 32-34, 47). Mr. Dearth's testimony in this regard was very 
much like that of Mr. Young and Mr. Marshall, the witnesses 
relied upon by this Court to sustain the work in New Mercur 
Mining Co. v. South Mercur Mining Co., supra. The actual work in 
New Mercur which was held to qualify as assessment work was done 
by parties having no legal relationship to the owner of the 
claims, who acted on their own initiative in following the ore in 
the tunnel on adjacent property. This Court expressly found that 
there was no evidence to show that they did the work under any 
direction from the owner of the claims or from any one having a 
legal relationship with the owner, so that the specific work 
could not have been done pursuant to a "prior plan" and the 
testimony about the value of the work in terms of the benefit to 
the claims in question was "in retrospect" or "after the fact." 
____,. 
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It has heretofore been demonstrated that Utah law does not 
require a prior plan, scheme, or system, but rather that what is 
required "is that the work, if continued will lead to a discovery 
and development of the • • • ore bodies that are supposed to 
exist in the claims." Nevada Exploration and Mining Company v. 
Spriggs, supra; this Brief, pages 32, 33. Mr. Dearth's testimony 
quoted on page 46 of this Brief, to the effect that the information 
developed from the assessment work in question has been and will 
be used to further explore and develop all of ATLAS CLAIMS, shows 
that the work meets this requirement. 
Further, the following testimony (which Appellants do not 
attack) of Ray Kozusko, the geologist directly involved with the 
CONOCO drilling in 1973 (for two of the critical assessment 
periods), to-wit: 
Q (By Mr. Anderson) After this project was 
completed in October and November of 1973 in which you 
were personally involved as you have indicated, did you 
evaluate the results of that project, of that particular 
drilling project, as well as all of the previous work 
that had been done; or that is, the information on the 
previous work (that) had (not) been done? (Word "that" 
should be added and word "not" deleted.) 
A Yes. 
Q And taking all of this information into con-
sideration, would you describe to the court how the 
drilling done in October and November of 1973 contributed 
to a geologic evaluation of this entire group of claims; 
that is, the claims that are involved in this lawsuit? 
A Can I round that out and add all the drilling 
in there as well as my February and March drilling? 
Q Yes, if you would. 
A It will be one complete picture. Well, it 
was designated in these gamma logs that we just looked 
at. Certain information can be gathered from the log 
itself; and together with the information that comes 
from the drill cuttings, as that drill hole is drilled, 
one can correlate geologic characteristics fr9m the 'ld 
drill cuttings back to this gamma log and beg1n to bu1 
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a physical picture in section or map view as to the 
geologic environment in a given area. In this case, 
we're talking about this claim group. 
(Witness indicating.) Now, there are 
various types of geologic environments which have been 
attributed to the formation of uranium ore deposits; 
and as one looks at all of this data, he begins to pull 
it together and build a train of thought or a possible 
model of genesis as it pertains to these ore deposits. 
And by studying one particular area and seeing other 
information from other sources around that particular 
area, one can come in here and take the detailed infor-
mation of the small area and apply it to the whole 
region; and in this case, it was quite successful. And 
that's basically it in a nutshell. 
(Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 37, 38). 
shows that CONOCO had a plan and that it was successful. 
....... 
Appellants assert that Mr. Dearth did not specifically state 
how the work benefitted the entire group of claims and quote Mr. 
Davis and Mr. Million at length to show that there was not any 
benefit. A careful study of the testimony of Mr. Davis and Mr. 
Million shows that their opinions that the work done by ATLAS and 
CONOCO did not benefit all ATLAS CLAIMS is based upon the assump-
tion that in order for the work to be of "benefit" it must indicab 
the presence of ore on all claims in the group. That is, it was 
their view that unless the drilling or mining on one claim is 
sufficiently close to another claim that the "pod" of ore that 
may be found on the first claim can be reasonably determined to 
extend to that adjoining claim, there is no benefit. 
Mr. Dearth, in the Transcript of March 23, 1978, at pages 
69-72, in response to a question as to how the work benefitted 
ATLAS CLAIMS and contributed to the development and/or extraction 
of uranium ores therefrom, explained the geologic history of the 
area and then testified: 
We are able to demonstrate that Atlas.Corpor-
ation and its predecessors, Texas Inc. (Zinc) Mlnerals 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 45 
has had the area under serious geologic evaluation since 
early 1962. Our exploration files contains hundreds of 
dri~l holes whereby we can gather the geologic infor-
mat~on to demonstrate the trend of these sands their 
thickness, and other geologic criteria.... ' 
Now that we've established the streams and the 
sediments that were deposited from the, in order to under-
stand the geology and the deposition of the uranium de-
posits, we have to go to that period in geologic time 
when the ore-bearing solutions were introduced to the 
sandstones. There is a technique whereby physicists can 
take a specimen of ore and date the rock that contains 
that specimen by radioactive decay. That process has 
established that most of the uranium deposits on the 
Colorado p~ateau are approximately sixty million years 
old. When these ore-nearing solutions were introduced 
to the sandstones -- and this sandstone is common(ly) 
referred to as the host sandstone, because it houses 
or forms a depository for the ore deposits -- the solutions 
responded to chemical and physical conditions that allowed 
the deposits to be formed in clusters that range from 
1,000 tons up to 50,000 tons. In addition to depositing 
(precipitating) out as ore bodies, these solutions also 
left evidence of having transgressed through the rocks. 
This evidence is manifested in bleaching of the sandstone 
from red to grey or green; decay of carbonaceous materials, 
which was (were) the trees which grew along the streams; 
color of the sandstone; and other geologic criteria that 
we've been able to collect from underground observations 
and drill holes. 
Now, as we gather this information -- and I would 
like to refer to the testimony of Mr. Black and the cross-
examination by Hr. Frandsen when he asked detailed questions 
about the information we gained from the drill holes --
you will recall that Mr. Frandsen picked some logs that 
showed ore grade material. Naturally, we are pleased 
when we drill a hole to find ore in it; and I would like 
to also mention at this time the opportunity to explain 
to Your Honor that these are the kinds of information that 
we get from the drill holes which is an answer to a question 
you asked several days ago. Not only is the mineralization 
recorded there, but the lithologic logs referred to during 
their cross-examination contains the information about the 
sand, which is helpful in making a judgment as to when 
(where) the next hole should be drilled. Mr. Frandsen 
pointed out that several of the drill logs contained no 
ore and he correctly referred to them as dry holes, using 
oil' terminology. I would like to say that that piece 
of information is important to the expiration (exploration) 
geologist also, because it indicates to him that he 
is off-trend· that he has chosen a location not com-
patible with' the depositional trend of the ore bodies. 
Therefore, he must re-evaluate where he will place his 
next hold (hole). His object is to find the trace or 
the pattern that leads from one pod to another. And I 
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want my testimony to be recorded to say that all of 
these criterion can be included throughout the district 
to find additional ore deposits. I would further state 
that since 1962 the accumulation of data, geologic data, 
that we have in our files has given me the confidence 
to recommend to our management to sink the Snow shaft 
which has been referred to in previous testimony as well 
as (the) current . • • shaft we are sinking at a cost 
of a million and a half dollars. I'm confident that 
these geologic guidelines that we gather from the assess-
ment work that was performed in the years you have re-
cited to me have been, can be, and will assist us in 
finding ore deposits throughout this district. 
The testimony of Mr. Dearth and Mr. Kozusko quoted above and 
that summarized on pages 8-10 of this Brief, show how the work 
done by CONOCO and Respondent during the critical periods did 
tend to develop all the claims and was proper prospecting work; 
that there are "trends" of ore across the property even though 
commercial ore may not have been blocked out in every corner of 
the property; and that a knowledge of these trends, which contri-
butes significantly to further development, is enhanced by the 
work done. There is also much in the testimony of Mr. Davis and 
Mr. Million not cited by Appellants which supports the above. 
Mr. Davis testified of "general trends", indications from such 
things as "sedimentation", "structure", and "structural geologic 
stratigraphy" (which "may give you a clue") and that there are 
"stringers" which may lead from one ore deposit to another. 
(Transcript of March 23, 1978, pages 141-159, 163.) Mr. Million 
acknowledged that there is a general trend or strike of ore 
through the area, that the way the ore is deposited is uniform, 
and that he would not recommend that the property be abandoned if 
his described development program did not reveal the existence of 
ore. (Transcript of March 24, 1978, pages 27-29). 
Appellants' interpretation of the term "benefit" and its 
underlying assumption that the validity of assessment work is 
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dependent upon the finding of ore on a particular claim is 
inconsistent with the Utah cases discussed above, none of which 
require that in order for work on one claim to serve as work on 
another it must show the existence of ore. On the contrary, the 
validity of the work was sustained even though it could not 
possibly have served that purpose. Nevada Exploration and 
Mining Co. v. Spriggs, supra, and Miehlich v. Tintic Standard 
Mining Co., supra, are the best examples of this. There is 
express language in Miehlich that attaining "a knowledge of 
underground conditions" is a benefit, which supports the Re-
spondent's interpretation of benefit. 
Respondent submits that Appellants are confusing principles 
dealing with a "calculation of ore reserves" with principles 
dealing with assessment work where the standard is entirely 
different. It is also worthy of note that Appellants' complaint 
that Mr. Dearth did not give specific facts to support his opinion 
of benefit was raised by Justice Straup in his dissent and was 
rejected by the majority of this Court in Nevada Exploration and 
Mining Co. v. Spriggs, supra. 
Appellants further complain because Mr. Dearth did not give 
"limitations or guidelines regarding the area benefitted." 
(Appellants' Brief, pages 32, 42, 43). It is a sufficient answer 
to this that Mr. Dearth testified as to ATLAS CLAIMS, the only 
property involved in the case, and neither he nor the courts 
involved need make any determination beyond that. 
Respondent strongly disputes the characterization of the 
testimony of Mr. Dearth that the drilling done was "a hit and 
miss type of activity" and contends that the evidence shows that 
the work was done on a very systematic and scientific basis. 
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(See the entire testimony of Raymond Sinkbeil, Ray Kozusko, James 
D. Black and Albert C. Dearth in Transcript of March 21, 1978, 
pages 141-147; Transcript of March 22, 1978, pages 2-42; Transcript 
of Barch 23, 1978, pages 37-52; Transcript of March 24, 1978, 
pages 36-39; Transcript of April 26, 1978, pages 75-77). 
In Pinkerton v. Moore, 66 N.M. 11, 340 P.2d 844 (1959), 
cited on page 22 of Appellants' Brief, the work which was rejected 
by the court was reconnaissance surveys (probably done with a 
geiger counter or similar instrument) which the court character-
ized as "geophysical" or geological" work. The holding was 
restricted in its application by the subsequent New Mexico case 
of Great Eastern Mines, Inc. v. Metals Corp., supra. Further, 
since the instant case does not involve geophysical or geological 
work, Pinkerton has no application here. 
Parker v. Belle Fourche Bentonite Products Company, supra, 
discussed on pages 22, 23 and 36 of Appellants' Brief, is distin-
guishable from the present case on two counts: First, in that 
case there was a finding of the trial court that the work did not 
benefit the claims in question, (See Simmons v. Muir, supra.) 
and, second, that in the case at hand there are ore trends throu~ 
the entire property about which the work in question gave infor-
mation. Even if Parker were not distinquishable, the decisions 
of this Court, heretofore discussed, are to the contrary and deal 
precisely with the issues here presented. 
What has been said above is a sufficient answer to the 
contention on page 47 of Appellants' Brief that Chambers v. 
Harrington, supra, places the burden on Respondent to show that 
the work benefits each claim by "facilitating the extraction of 
minerals from each of the claims." That is not the test in 
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' chambers nor in any of the other Utah cases. 
Finally, once again, the issue is one of fact. Love v. Mt. 
Oddie Mines Co. , supra; Simmons v. !1uir, supra. The Trial Judge 
found that the work did benefit each of ATLAS CLAIMS and that the 
assessment work was done. (This Brief, page 10). Under the rule 
of review in Rummell v. Bailey, supra, "taking all of the evi-
dence and every inference and intendment fairly arising there-
from .•• in the light most favorable" to the findings of the Trial 
Court, the evidence supports these findings. As in Nevada Explor-
ation and Mining Co. v. Spriggs, supra, and New Mercur Mining Co. 
v. South Mercur Mining Co. supra, the findings are "not clearly 
against the preponderance of the evidence" and should not be 
disturbed. 
SUMMARY 
The issues before the Court are essentially factual. The 
Trial Judge determined all the issues in favor of Respondent and 
against Appellants and decided that: 
I. ATLAS CLAIMS are valid, that they have not been moved 
and their location on the ground and dimensions are as shown on 
Exhibits 41, 42 and 43. 
II. At the time HIHOPE CLAIMS (part of ATLAS CLAIMS) were 
located in February, 1961, the land covered by those claims was 
open to location and DESERT RAT CLAIMS and SAND VALLEY CLAIMS 
were: 
A. Not validly located; and 
B. If they were, the annual assessment work was not 
done for the critical periods so that those claims were subject 
to relocation in February, 1961. 
III. The assessment work was done on ATLAS CLAIMS for the 
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periods critical to POWELL CLAIMS so that the land covered by 
POWEI,L CLAIMS was not open to location when POWELL CLAIMS were 
located. 
Under the applicable law the evidence supports the decision 
of the Trial Court in favor of Respondent and the same should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this ~ day of September, 1979. 
/CJiicJ~d ..h~.,( ... ,LJ-<-~fJ 
L. Robert Anderson 
Attorney for Respondent 
P. 0. Box 275 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
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